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ABSTRACT 
The positive influence of subsidies on merchandise exports is well 
known from international trade theory literature. However, the empirical 
evidence on the relationship itself remains ambiguous. This article fills 
a gap in the existing pool of research by conducting a panel data empirical 
analysis over two decades for 140 countries to understand the relationship 
between their overall budgetary subsidies and aggregate merchandise 
export inclination. The detailed research findings of this paper underline 
the importance of going beyond the "Bali Package" agreed in December 
2013 and concluding the Doha Round Negotiations of the World Trade 
Organization ("WTO"). The outline for the Bali agreement was that the 
Members of the WTO would exercise utmost restraint in using any form 
of export subsidy. Because of this inability to reach binding decisions, 
the Bali agreement is open ended and relies on good will and restraint. 
Fundamentally, this article stresses the positive impact of disciplining 
subsidies in particular in no uncertain terms. The results of this article 
lead to two important conclusions. First, the economic analysis shows 
that developing countries should realize that a subsidy-based trade war is 
more likely to put them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the WTO 
developed members; and second, the legal analysis shows that the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") 
requires urgent clarification in the negotiating tables to ensure the global 
economy does not suffer major turbulences in the coming years. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of establishing the World Trade Organization 
("WTO") in 1995 has been to enhance international trade flows through 
elimination or reduction of various unfair trade practices. While the 
WTO negotiations have been able to phase out the traditional trade 
barriers like import quotas and have been broadly successful in reducing 
the tariff barriers, limiting the trade distortions arising from subsidies still 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/3
2014] Curtailing Subsidy Wars in Global Trade 3 
remains an area of concern. 1 The situation before the Ninth Ministerial 
Conference2 did not look promising. 3 "[A] number of countries opposed 
any legally binding decision in Bali, including lower limits on export 
subsidies. "4 The outline for the Bali agreement was that WTO countries 
would "'exercise utmost restraint' in using any form of export subsidy."5 
"Because of this inability to reach binding decisions, the Bali agreement 
is open ended and relies on good will and restraint."6 "In all, the 
agricultural package in the Bali agreement has moved the stakes on very 
little."7 "With no legally binding arrangements, the [gray areas in the] 
goodwill statements are open to abuse and the disputes' panel of the 
1. To offset price advantages of imported products, states make specific monetary 
payments or provide tax relief to domestic producers, allowing them to lower domestic or 
export prices and obtain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis competing foreign products. 
Subsidies exist in different forms ( export subsidies, domestic subsidies, production subsidies 
or decoupled subsidies [direct payments]). Subsidies are specific and different from general 
payments, such as social security to which the public at large or large segments of the 
population are entitled. See generally M.C.E.J. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD 
MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES OF PROTECTIONISM IN GATT 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED STATES LAW (1985); T. Josling & S. Tangermann, 
Production and Export Subsidies in Agriculture: Lessons from GA TT and WTP Disputes 
Involving the us and the EC, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE us, AND 
THE WTO 207 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003); James Rude, Under 
the Green Box: The WTO and Farm Subsidies, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1015 (2001). 
2. The WTO Ninth Ministerial Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, from the 3rdto 
the 6th of December 2013. See Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, WORLD TRADE 
ORO., available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto _ e/minist_ e/mc9 _ el 
bali_texts_combined_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014)[hereinafter Bali Declaration]; see 
generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO 's Supremacy in the 
International Trade Order - A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 9 (2013); Julien Chaisse, Compliance with 
International Law as a Process- Deconstructing the Obligation of Conformity, 38 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2015). 
3. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, DAIRYVIETNAMCO., LTD., available at 
http://www.dairyvietnam.com. vn/en/News/World-Trade-Organisation-Truly-Delivers.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). "In May, the G- 20 group of developing countries had called on 
developed countries to [reduce in halfJ their ceilings on the money they spend on export 
subsidies by the end of 2013 and phase in a 540-day limit in the repayment period for export 
credit." Id. "The final target is 180 days." Id. "The G-20 also called for a limit on the 
quantities of subsidized exports, at the average actually exported with subsidies for 2003-
2005 ." Id. 
4. "The United States in particular wanted to grant this exception on a temporary basis 
only." Christian lgnatzi, WTO Bali Agreement Expected to Boost Growth, DW (July 12, 
2013), available at http://www.dw.de/wto-bali-agreement-expected-to-boost-growth/a-
l 7278088 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). Also, "India wanted to make sure that food would 
remain affordable for its poor population of 800 million and therefore had insisted on 
permission to subsidize rice and grain." Id. 
5. See generally Bali Declaration, supra note 2. 
6. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3. 
7. Id. 
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[WTO] could be just as busy as it has been with countries arguing over 
subsidies and tariffs and quotas as much as they have over the last [ two 
decades.]"8 
The present analysis contributes to the understanding of the 
relationship between overall government financial transfers (i.e., 
budgetary subsidies) and aggregate merchandise exports as a percentage 
of gross domestic product ("GDP") in two ways. First, it shows that the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") 
requires clarification in the negotiating tables. Second, developing 
countries should realize that a subsidy-based trade war is more likely to 
put them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the developed WTO 
members. 
Provision of subsidies to local players can be explained by several 
underlying motivations from the standpoint of national governments, 
namely, industrial development, facilitating innovation, supporting 
national champions, securing environment-related objectives, ensuring 
redistribution, etc.9 The subsidies can be provided to the local players 
through interventions both in the input as well as output markets. The 
efficacy of subsidy policy as a strategic trade instrument is however 
crucially linked with the local industry's learning capability and the 
extent to which the domestic and foreign goods are substitutable. 10 The 
trade theoretic literature notes that in a scenario characterized by fast 
capital mobility, imposition of import tariffs leads to better welfare 
implication as compared to export subsidies. 11 Nevertheless, presence of 
domestic distortions in lower income countries result to frequent 
deployment of subsidy measures to further long-term goals, as they 
function as more efficient trade policy instrument vis-a-vis import 
tariffs. 12 
8. Id. 
9. See Terry Collins-Williams & Gerry Salembier, International Disciplines on 
Subsidies: The GATT, the WTO and the Future Agenda, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1996); see 
also Simon Lester, The Problem Of Subsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons From the 
WTO EC-Aircraft Case, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2013). 
10. See Marc J. Melitz, When and How Should Infant Industries be Protected?, 66 J. 
INT'L ECON. 177 (2005); Kym Anderson, Subsidies and Trade Barriers (paper presented at a 
roundtable in Copenhagen on 24-28 May 2004, as a part of the Copenhagen Consensus 
project) available at http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/cp-
tradefinished.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
11. See Tanapong Potipiti, Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies in the World Trade 
Organization: A Small - Country Approach (ARTNeT Working Paper No. 119, Bangkok, 
ESCAP, 2012), available at 
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/ A WP%20No.%20119 .pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014). 
12. See generally Jagdish Bhagwati & V. K. Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs 
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Apart from the aforesaid determinants, promoting exports of 
domestic players who are in competition with their foreign counterparts 
in the global market is a major driving motive for providing subsidies. 13 
The standard trade analysis observes that the subsidies provided by 
national governments enable the domestic producers suffering from cost 
disadvantage to sell their products in the international markets at a 
relatively cheaper price, thereby resulting in a rise in their exports. 14 The 
theoretical relationship between subsidies and exports is clearly 
observed, irrespective of market structure, as the policy is capable of 
delivering both in the presence of competitive, as well as oligopolistic, 
markets. 15 Several export subsidy programs are operational in European 
countries and the U.S., which provide their firms greater advantage vis-
a-vis their foreign competitors. 16 The adoption of export subsidies as a 
strategic policy instrument has been reported extensively in the 
literature. 17 For instance, production and export subsidies in a home 
country may motivate multinational corporations from abroad to locate 
production facilities there. 18 
The trade-distorting effects of subsidies in general, and export 
subsidies in particular, are widely acknowledged to be in conflict with 
core WTO principle of fair trade. The mandate of the ongoing WTO 
negotiations under the Agreement of Agriculture ("AoA") and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") are to 
ensure better discipline on both direct (e.g. direct payment) as well as 
indirect ( e.g. revenue foregone by preferential electricity and fuel price, 
lowered interest payment on restructured loans) financial transfers. 19 As 
and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44-50 (1963). 
13. See generally Gary N. Horlick,A Personal History of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, 
47 J. WORLD TRADE 447 (2013); see also James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Export 
Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985). 
14. See generally Horlick, supra note 13; see also Brander & Spencer, supra note 13. 
15. See Cees van Beers, Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, Andre de Moor & Frans 
Oosterhuis, Determining the Environmental Effects of Indirect Subsidies: Integrated Method 
and Application to the Netherlands, 39 APPLIED ECON. 2465 (2007); see also Avinash Dixit, 
International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries, 94 ECON. J. 1 (1984). 
16. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, NATIONAL TRADE POLICY FOR EXPORT SUCCESS, 
U.N. Doc. P248.E/DCP/BTP/11-XI, U.N. Sales No. E.12.III.T.3 (2011). 
17. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and 
Agricultural Trade Disputes, 13 ECON. & POL. 113 (2001); see also Andrew Y. Lemon, The 
Peril of Implementing Export Subsidies in the Presence of Special Interests (Feb. 21, 2003) 
(preliminary draft) (on file with the Yale University Department of Economics), available at 
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/Industrial-
Organization/lemon-030225.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
18. See generally Davin Chor, Subsidies for FD!: Implications from a Model with 
Heterogeneous Firms, 78 J. INT'L ECON. 113 (2009). 
19. See generally Legal Texts: A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, 
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per AoA and ASCM provisions, subsidies are classified under two broad 
categories, namely, actionable (i.e. subsidies which are directly linked 
with production and hence trade-distorting) and non-actionable (i.e. 
subsidies which are not directly linked with production and hence have 
lesser impact on trade). The goal of the current WTO negotiations is to 
limit the actionable subsidies20 ( e.g. certain forms of fisheries subsides, 
amber and blue box subsidies in agriculture) and discontinuation of all 
forms of agricultural export subsidies. 21 While the Doha Development 
Agenda ("DDA") negotiations have been broadly successful in reforming 
the export subsidies scenario, the prevalence of domestic subsidies in 
several member countries remains a major concern area.22 
In this context, the present analysis intends to contribute to the 
literature by exploring the relationship between government financial 
transfers (i.e., budgetary subsidies) and merchandise exports as a 
percentage of GDP in a cross-country framework. The aim is to provide 
some policy recommendations ( or at least orientation) which could guide 
current negotiations for the benefit of all WTO members. 
The paper is arranged along the following lines. First, a brief 
discussion on the research frontier on subsidies and their potential 
implications on exports is conducted. Secondly, the reflection of this 
understanding in the regulatory context provided by the WTO' s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") is 
analyzed in its key dimensions. Third, the data sources are explained and 
macro trends of the principal variables are illustrated. A cross-country 
empirical analysis is undertaken next for understanding the influence of 
budgetary subsidies on export inclination. Finally on the basis of the 
empirical results, a few policy conclusions are drawn. 
WORLD TRADE ORO., available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#kAgreement (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
20. See generally Debashis Chakraborty, Julien Chaisse & Animesh Kumar, Doha 
Round Negotiations on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures: Potential Implications on 
Trade Flows in Fishery Sector, 6 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL. 201, 201-34 
(2011). 
21. See Ian F. Fergusson, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha 
Development Agenda, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2011). 
22. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures , (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 186, 2003), available 
at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/186.aos _.subsidies.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014); see also Julien Chaisse & Puneeth Nagaraj, Changing Lanes: Trade, Investment and 
Intellectual Property Rights, 37 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 223-70 (2014). 
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IL UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF WTO RULES ON 
SUBSIDIES 
7 
Although subsidies specifically geared towards export promotion 
contribute more in boosting exports, even domestic subsidies may cause 
over-production and lead to enhanced exports for releasing the downward 
pressure on prices in domestic market. The positive relationship between 
subsidies and exports is observed both in case of agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors. 
A. The Agricultural Sector 
Agricultural export subsidies have emerged as a major policy 
instrument adopted in both developed and developing countries during 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") period and WTO 
days. Both agricultural input subsidies ( e.g. fertilizer subsidy, irrigation 
subsidy in terms of free electricity) and output subsidies ( e.g. per unit 
support at higher than market price) may lead to over-production, thereby 
fueling export opportunities. 23 
Agricultural export subsidies have been extensively used in the U.S. 
during pre-WTO days. In 1993, the payments under the Export 
Enhancement Program ("EEP") crossed U.S. $1 billion. 24 The support to 
U.S. players in terms of export credit arrangements, including deferred 
interest payments, government guarantees for securing loans at lower 
interest rates, etc. have also played crucial roles.25 Similarly in the EU, 
the primary sector (e.g. dairy and poultry sector) received export 
subsidies in the order of€ 1 billion and €650 million in 2008 and 2009 
respectively through the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). 26 It has 
been noted that developing countries like Brazil, India, Mexico, South 
Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, etc. also provide considerable volume of 
agricultural subsidies. 27 
23 . See generally Sacchidananda Mukherjee & Debashis Chakraborty, Relationship 
Between Fiscal Subsidies and C02 Emissions: Evidence from Cross-Country Empirical 
Estimates, ECON. RES. INT'L, Vol. 2014 (2014). 
24. See Howard D. Leathers, Agricultural Export Subsidies as a Tool of Trade Strategy: 
Before and After the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 83 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 209 (2001). 
25. See generally James Rude, Reform of Agricultural Export Credit Programs, 1 ESTEY 
CTR. J. lNT'L L. & TRADE POL. 66 (2000). 
26. See Dirk Willem te Velde et al., The EU's Common Agricultural Policy and 
Development, 79 OVERSEAS DEV. INST. PROJECT BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2012). 
27. See Arvind Panagariya, Agricultural Liberalisation and the Least Developed 
Countries: Six Fallacies, 28 WORLD ECON. 1277, 1285 (2005). 
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B. The Industrial Sector 
The subsidies given to the industrial sector and their implications for 
exports constitute another major branch of literature. The positive 
influence of government subsidies in Japan for promotion of progressive 
industries and exports deserves mention. 28 Apart from the direct 
subsidies, indirect subsidies like fuel subsidies can significantly lower the 
variable cost of production in capital-intensive sectors like iron and steel 
etc., which also provide them substantial edge in the export markets over 
competitors. 29 Incidence of high volume of fuel subsidies both in 
developed30 and emerging countries31 and their potential export 
implications has been reported in the literature. 
C. The Positive Relationship as Classic Analysis 
The literature on the subsidy-export interrelationship in developed 
countries has generally showed a positive relationship between the two. 
Agricultural export subsidies have significantly boosted exports from the 
recipient countries. 32 The evidence of subsidized wheat exports from the 
U.S. displacing the same from competitor countries deserves mention 
here.33 Similarly, the dairy subsidies in both Canada and the U.S. have 
enhanced their global exports.34 Empirical estimates for Portugal35 and 
28. See David De Meza, Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect? , 19 
CANADIAN J. ECON. 347, 347 (1986). 
29. See Peter Thomas in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy Shaping 
International Trade and Investment Patterns - Evidence from the Iron and Steel Industry, 18 
(Inst. ofE. Asian Studies, Univ. of Duisburg-Essen, Working Paper No. 88, 2011), available 
at http://www.uni-due.de/in-east/fileadmin/publications/ gruen/ 
paper88.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
30. See David Victor, The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES 
INITIATIVE 11-13 (2008), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/politics_ffs.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
31. See Reforming Energy Subsidies: Opportunities to Contribute to the Climate Change 
Agenda, UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME (2008), available at 
http://www. unep. org/pdf/pressreleases/reforming_ energy_ subsidies. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014). 
32. See Bernard Hoekman, Francis Ng & Marcelo Olarreaga, The Impact of Agricultural 
Support Policies on Developing Countries, in I REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: KEY ISSUES FOR A PRO-DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME OF THE DOHA 
ROUND 100, 100-31 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007). 
33. See generally H. G. Brooks, S. Devadoss & W. H. Meyers, The Impact of the US. 
Wheat Export Enhancement Program on the World Wheat Market, 38 CANADIAN J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 253 (1990). 
34. See Kenneth W. Bailey, Comparison of the US. and Canadian Dairy Industries 
(The Pa. State. Univ. Dep't of Agric. Econ. & Rural Soc'y, Staff Paper No. 349, 2002), 
available at http:/ /www.agmrc.org/media/cms/staffpaper349 _ 42eab l 6a91 e4f.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014). 
35. See Oscar Afonso & Armando Silva, Non-Scale Endogenous Growth Effects of 
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West Germany36 also confirm the positive relationship between subsidies 
and exports. 
The positive relationship between subsidies and exports has been 
observed in several developing and emerging countries as well. In South 
Korea, the implementation of a preferential tax system and subsidy 
allocation for export activities led to a transformation of the export basket 
of the country towards more value-added manufacturing products. 37 The 
massive export growth in China has caused researchers to focus on its 
subsidy policy as an explanatory variable. The firm-level panel 
estimation results show that production subsidies facilitate exports, and 
the effect is more evident for profit-making firms as well as capital-
intensive industries. 38 The influence of subsidies on Chinese 
manufacturing exports has been established under heterogeneous firm 
structure as well.39 In addition to macro-level analysis, panel data 
regressions with Chinese provincial data reveal the strong influence of 
subsidies on state owned enterprises ("SO Es") exports, as the government 
financial devolution helps them to overcome the high production costs.40 
In the Malaysian context, the positive long-run relationship between 
subsidies and exports has been confirmed through a cointegration test. 41 
Interestingly, while the positive influence of firm-specific subsidies on 
exports in Colombia has been observed, the impact is found to be 
diminishing in subsidy size. 42 
Nevertheless, a section of the literature questions the influence of 
export subsidies, in particular their quantum, on exports. 43 In the East 
German context, no relationship between subsidies and exports has been 
Subsidies for Exporters, 29 ECON. MODELLING 1248 (2012), available at 
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2012/Programme/Papers/32.pdf (last visited on Nov. 14, 2014). 
36. See Sourafel Girma, Holger Gorg & Joachim Wagner, Subsidies and Exports in 
Germany: First Evidence from Enterprise Panel Data, 55 APPLIED ECON. Q. 179 (2009). 
3 7. See Wontack Hong, Export-Oriented Growth and Trade Patterns of Korea, in 
TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN PACIFIC ASIA 273, 273-306 (Colin J. Bradford, Jr. & 
William H. Branson eds., 1987). 
38. See Surafel Girma et al., Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export 
Performance? Evidence from Firm-level Data, 111 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 863 (2009). 
39. See Fabrice Defever & Alejandro Riaflo, China's Pure Exporter Subsidies (Ctr. for 
Econ. Performance, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working Paper No. 1182, 2012), 
available at http://cep.lse.ac. uk/pubs/download/dp 1182. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ). 
40. See generally Richard S. Eckaus, China's Exports, Subsidies to State Owned 
Enterprises and the WTO, 17 CHINA ECON. Rev. 1 (2006). 
41. See Bakri Abdul Karim & Shazali Abu Mansor, Subsidy and Export: Malaysian 
Case, sec. 4 (Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/37025/1/MPRA_paper_37025.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
42. See Christian Helmers & Natalia Trofimenko, The Use and Abuse of Export 
Subsidies: Evidence from Colombia, 36 WORLD ECON. 465, 481-83 (2013). 
43. See Girma, Gorg & Wagner supra note 36, at 2. 
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established.44 The weak influence of export subsidies on exports has been 
confirmed in Turkey45 and Japan46 as well. Empirical estimates with 
respect to U.S. firms have also revealed that the effect of subsidies on 
exports is not statistically significant. 47 Similarly, the firm-specific 
analysis on the interrelationship between subsidies and export decisions 
in Ireland fails to find any significant relationship between the two. 48 
Adoption of export subsidies has turned out to be a suboptimal policy 
instrument in Latin American countries like Argentina, Mexico49 and 
Costa Rica as well. 50 
The absence of statistically significant relationship between 
subsidies and exports in several developing countries and least developed 
countries ("LDCs") can be explained by the poor implementation 
performance by the national governments. Kenya had been a prominent 
example of this phenomenon. 51 The underlying reason of the failure to 
promote exports even after adopting the subsidization strategy in Bolivia 
has been accorded to the decision of non-discretionary implementation of 
the policy. Conversely, Korea and Brazil have succeeded in their attempt 
by following a path of discretion and selectivity. 52 
III. EXPLORING THE REFLECTION OF TRADE THEORY 
PREDICTIONS INTO THE WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The existing literature notes the possibility of trade diversion from 
efficient producers due to an export-oriented focus and other forms of 
subsidies received by their competitors, which may lead to subsidy and 
44. See id. at 7. 
45. See Ismail Arslan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, Export Incentives, Exchange Rate 
Policy and Export Growth in Turkey, 75 Rev. ECON. & STAT. 128, 132 (1993). 
46. See Hiroshi Ohashi, Learning by Doing, Export Subsidies, and Industry Growth: 
Japanese Steel in the 1950s and 1960s, 66 INT'L ECON. 297, 319 (2005). 
47. See Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, Why Some Firms Export, 86 Rev. 
ECON. & STAT. 561, 569 (2004). 
48. See Holger Gorg, Michael Henry & Eric Strobl, Grant Support and Exporting 
Activity, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 168, 173 (2008). 
49. See Julio Nogues, The Experience of Latin America with Export Subsidies, 126 Rev. 
WORLD ECON. (WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV) 97, 104-05 (1990). 
50. See generally Alexander Hoffinaister, The Cost of Export Subsidies: Evidence from 
Costa Rica, 39 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 1, 138 (1992). 
51. See Patrick Low, Export Subsidies and Trade Policy: The Experience of Kenya, 10 
WORLD DEV. 293, 302 (1982). 
52. See Dani Rodrick, Taking Trade Policy Seriously: Export Subsidization as a Case 
Study in Policy Effectiveness, (Nat'] Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4567, 
Dec. 1993), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w4567 .pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). 
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countervailing duty wars for reversing that advantage. 53 Such subsidies 
are specific and different from general payments, such as social security 
related expenses to which the public at large or large segments of the 
population are entitled. On one hand, they can improve the returns to 
domestic producers, but on the other hand, they can distort trade. 54 The 
additional concern here comes from the fact that the developing country 
and LDCs firms do not receive the same level of supports received by 
their developed country counterparts, which significantly constrain their 
market access both in home and foreign markets. 55 This is reflected in 
the negotiations and the text of the ASCM.56 The compromise at the heart 
of the WTO regulation of subsidies resulted in an agreement which 
required the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") to clarify a number 
of concepts in the case law. Export subsidies are indeed quite susceptible 
to abuse.57 
A. The Policy and the Law 
The evolution on subsidy regulation in international trade system 
started with the Havana Charter, which became the basis for future 
agreements on subsidies, such as: the GATT, Subsidies Code of the 
Tokyo Round and the ASCM of the Uruguay Round. 58 The ASCM 
Agreement defines the term 'subsidy' in detail in Article 1.59 Moreover, 
it classifies subsidies into three broad categories: i) prohibited; ii) 
53. See generally KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2002); see Renee Sharp & UssifR. Sumaila, Quantification of the 
US. Marine Fisheries Subsidies, 29 N. AMER. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 18 (2009); Anne Tallontire, 
Trade Issues on Background Paper: The Impact of Subsidies on Trade in Fisheries Products, 
(Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Project Paper No. 26109, July 2004); Donald J. 
Boudreaux, Do Subsidies Justify Retaliatory Protectionism?, 31 ECON. AFF. 4 (2011). 
54. The striking example of trade distorting subsidies, the upland cotton subsidies 
granted by US government for local farmers which had more adverse consequences away 
from its shores. The efforts of rural farmers in developing countries are being undermined by 
these subsidies. However, econometric findings have questioned the compensation judgment 
of WTO in Brazil's favor. For details see Kilungu Nzaku, Matt Vining & Jack E. Houston, 
US. Cotton Subsidies: Are Brazil 's Accusations True? (presented at S. Agric. Econ. Ass'n 
Annual Meeting, No. 6749, (2008) available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6749/2/sp08nzl 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
55. See generally Erich Supper, Is There Effectively A Level Playing Field For 
Developing Country Exports?, U.N. Sales No. E-00-11-0-22 (2001). 
56. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE 
ORO., available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (last visited Nov. 
13 2014). 
57. See Nogues, supra note 49, at 112. 
58. See Chakraborty, Chaisse & Kumar, supra note 20, at 204. 
59. See Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, The 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement, 17 
WORLD COMPETITION 41, 42 ( 1993 ). 
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actionable; and iii) non-actionable subsidies.60 This categorisation is 
sometimes referred to as a 'traffic light' approach. Prohibited subsidies 
are "red light" subsidies, which are harmful to trade per se. 61 Non-
actionable subsidies are "green light" subsidies, which are considered to 
be permitted on the grounds of an explicit reference in the legal text. 62 
Lastly, actionable subsidies are "yellow light" subsidies, which are open 
to be challenged only if they are considered to cause adverse effects on 
international trade. 63 
In the present ASCM, some uncertainties remain as to the meaning 
and legal implications of some basic concepts. In this connection, the 
ASCM architecture has been challenged at times from the perspective of 
efficiency. The lack of purpose in the agreement itself has come under 
heavy criticism on the ground that the countries may be forced to remove 
socially beneficial subsidies as well. 64 In particular, the sensitivity of the 
agreement with economic considerations is strongly questioned. 65 
Questions have also been raised on the optimality of disciplining 
subsidies beyond the non-violation doctrine. 66 In addition, it is held that 
WTO' s subsidy rules would have yielded greater result only after 
substantial tariff reductions under GATT. 67 
60. Hyung-Jin Kim, Reflections on the Green Light Subsidy for Environmental 
Purposes, 3 3 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 167 (1999). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. This category unfortunately was applied only for a period of five years beginning 
with the entry into force of the WTO, since developing countries were afraid it would be 
excessively used by industrialized countries. Today efforts are under way to put it back, as 
the category is important for the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs") 
in developing countries as well. See id. 
63. Id. The definition of a subsidy within the meaning of Articles l and 3 of the SCM 
Agreement (prohibited subsidies) was addressed by the Appellate Body in various cases, most 
prominently in US - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' (WT/DS108/AB/R), as 
well as in Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (WT/DS139/AB/R, 
WT/DS142/AB/R 994). See Appellate Body Report Canada, Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R 994 (May 31, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop _ e/dispu _ e/2823d.pdf; Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations ", WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 
2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
108abrw_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
64. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will International Rules on Subsidies 
Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 877 (2006). 
65. See generally PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, PATRICK A. MESSERLIN & JASPER M. 
w AUTERS, THE LA w AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN THE WTO (Edward 
Elgar Publ'g 2008). 
66. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, James Kowal & Patricia Kowal, The Questionable 
Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 475, 473-
523 (2010). 
67. See David R. DeRemer, The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules, (Universite 
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Hence, in recent period international trade governance has been 
characterised by a progressive regulation on subsidies, tightening 
disciplines over time in order to avoid such distortions. These rules 
essentially seek to balance the need for redistribution and implementation 
of legitimate policy goals and to avoid protectionism and unnecessary 
distortions of conditions of competition on domestic markets. Trade-
restrictive border measures apply to countervail unlawful subsidies but 
are not at the heart of legal rules relating to this important field of 
international trade law. 
It is argued that the subsidies are often sector-specific and their 
"narrowly tailored" nature, as well as government legal arrangements 
pertaining to data dissemination, may prohibit circulation of full 
information on them in the public domain. 68 The problem gets further 
compounded in case of the indirect subsidies (i.e., income foregone rather 
than budgetary transfers). The subsidies data reporting also suffers from 
a "forum bias", as several countries have reported relatively higher 
fisheries subsidies figures to the OECD and APEC as compared to the 
corresponding figures reported to WTO. 69 This kind of massive under-
reporting makes 'disciplining' of subsidies through the multilateral 
negotiations all the more difficult. 70 
B. The Practice of Countervailing Duty71 
The alleged continuation of subsidies in foreign countries have often 
led countries to take recourse to trade remedial measures. In order to 
Libre de Bruxelles: ECARES, Working Paper No. 2013-45, 2013), available at 
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/153041 /1/2013-45-DEREMER-
theevolution.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ). 
68. Government Subsidies: Revealing the Hidden Budget, PEW ECON. PoL'Y GROUP 
(2013 ), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ 
pcs _ assets/2013/Subsidyscope20Framing20Paperpdf.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ). 
69. Hard Facts, Hidden Problems: A Review of Current Data on Fishing Subsidies, 
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (2001); see Ussif Rashid Sumalia et al., Catching More Bait: A 
Bottom-up Re-estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies, 12 J. BIOECONOMICS 201, 201-25 
(2010). 
70. See Exploring the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO, WORLD TRADE 
0RG. (2006), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res _ e/booksp _ e/anrep _ e/world _ trade _report06 _ e.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
71. The analysis undertaken in this section draws from the methodology developed by 
Chaisse and Chakraborty (2007) and Chakraborty and Khan (2008). See Julien Chaisse & 
Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The 
Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L 
ECON. L. 153 (2007); see also DEBASHIS CHAKRABORTY & AMIR ULLAH KHAN, THE WTO 
DEADLOCKED: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Los Angeles and 
London: Sage Publications 2008). 
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further the analysis, we constructed Figure 1 in which all countervailing 
duty investigations initiated from 1995 to 2013 have been reported. 
Figure 1: Countervailing Duty Investigations Initiated from 1995 to 










- Initiations - - Measures 
I 
0 
Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database 
Figure 1 allows us to observe that the number of global 
Countervailing Duty ("CVD") initiations and CVD measures in response 
to subsidies has shown a fluctuating trend during 1995-2013. The 
number of CVD initiations exhibited a continuous increasing trend from 
1996 to 1999 and was at its peak in 1999 with 41 initiations during that 
year. Since 1999 however a cyclical pattern is being observed. The 
scenario improved considerably in 2005, when the number of initiations 
reached a minimum of 6. However, SCM initiations have increased ever 
since and reached 28 and 25 initiations during 2009 and 2011 
respectively. The trend indicates that CVD activism has been influenced 
strongly by the global recession, with increase in initiation incidence 
during crisis years. However, the sharp rise in CVD initiations during 
2013 indicates grievances among countries, which causes serious 
concern. The imposition of CVD measures has also shown a similar 
cyclical pattern. While an increasing trend has been observed in CVD 
measures during 1996-2000, an overall decreasing trend was noticed 
during 2001-2007 with minor fluctuations. However, the number of 
measures increased to 11 in 2008 and further to 19 in 2010. The CVD 
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measures, like initiations, have also shown an increasing trend during 
2013. 
In order to understand the SCM imposing behavior of the major 
trading countries with respect to each other during the period of January 
1, 1995 to December 31, 2013, Table 1 has been constructed from WTO 
data. While the countries facing the SCM measures are noted row-wise, 
the countries initiating the same are reported column-wise. A total of335 
SCM actions have been cumulatively initiated during this period. The 
United States (U.S.) topped the list by accounting for 41.19% of the total 
CVD initiations, followed by the EU (21.49% ). Interestingly, a 
significant proportion of the initiations made by the U.S. have taken place 
against major Asian economies like China (28.26%) and India (12.32%). 
On the other hand, only 15 SCM initiations has been undertaken against 
the U.S, of which 3 were initiated by Canada and the EU each and 4 by 
China. 
A similar trend has been noticed in case of the EU as well. Among 
the 72 SCM cases initiated, 27.78% of the total number of cases has been 
lodged against India. The other countries suffering from the EU SCM 
initiations include China (11.11 %), South Korea (9.72%) and Taiwan 
(8.33%), where the last two countries are not reported in the table. On 
the contrary, the EU has faced only 14 initiations on SCM ground against 
its exports. The lower SCM activism against the EU or U.S. can hardly 
be considered as evidence signifying lesser devolution of subsidies within 
their territories. 
15
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Table 1: Subsidy and Countervailing Duty Initiation and 















Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database 
* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures. 
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Looking at the other end of the spectrum, it is observed that China 
presently tops the list of the countries suffering from the SCM initiations 
(22.69% of the total cumulative initiations), followed by India (18.21 %) 
and South Korea (5.97%) (not shown in Table 1). Canada, the EU and 
the U.S. jointly initiated 85.53% and 70.49% of all the SCM initiations 
against China and India respectively. However, other developing 
countries like South Africa have also targeted Indian exports on SCM 
grounds. On the whole an interesting picture emerges from the analysis; 
while Canada, the EU and the U.S. account for 73.73% of all SCM 
initiations, China, India and South Korea account for 46.87% of the 
affected cases. If Indonesia and Thailand are also added to the list of the 
affected developing countries, the corresponding figure reaches 56.12%. 
Clearly the low cost economies of Asia are emerging as the major targets 
of SCM activism in leading developed countries. 
The SCM measures are reported in the parenthesis of the same table 
and a similar conclusion emerges from the analysis. The calculations 
reveal that Canada, the EU and the U.S. jointly account for 71.58% of all 
SCM measures during the study period. On the other hand, among the 
target economies, China, India and South Korea account for 50.00% of 
the total SCM measures. 
The finding underlines the need to have a closer analysis of the SCM 
activism followed by Canada, the EU and the U.S., which is reported at 
Harmonized System ("HS") sectional level in Table 2. Section XV, 
which consists of Base Metals and articles of Base Metals, is found to 
attract most of the SCM initiations for these three players. It deserves 
mention that the sector is the recipient of subsidies in several countries, 
especially fuel subsidies. The triad has jointly initiated 89 .31 % of the 
total SCM initiations and 82.42% of the total measures in this sector. The 
SCM activism for base metals is particularly high in the U.S. The other 
major sectors facing SCM challenges in the triad include low-tech 
products in Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and articles 
thereof), Section Vl (Products of Chemical or allied industries) and 
Section IV (prepared foodstuff, etc.). However, a relatively sophisticated 
product group like machinery and electrical appliances (Section XVI) has 
also been subject to SCM actions. While the EU has adopted several 
SCM actions on plastic and rubber products and textile products, U.S. 
actions on chemical products are significant. 
17
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Table 2: Canadian, EU and U.S. Countervailing Initiations I 
Measures by Product Type - A Comparative Analysis (1.1.95 -
31.12.13)* 
Live Animals; Animal Products 
Vegetable Products 
Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, 
Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and 
Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes 3 (1) 
Mineral Products 0 
Products of the Chemical or Allied 
Industries 
Plastics and Articles Thereof; 
Rubber and Articles Thereof 0 
Wood and Articles of Wood; 
Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles 
of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of 
Esparto or of Other Plaiting 
Materials; Basketware and 
Wickerwork l (1) 0 4 (2 
Pulp Of Wood or of Other Fibrous 
Cellulosic Material; Recovered 
(Waste and Scrap) Paper or 
Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard 
and Articles Thereof 0 8 (5 
Textiles and Textile Articles 0 2 2 
Footwear, head ear etc. 0 0 
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, 
Asbestos, Mica or Similar 
Materials; Ceramic Products; 
Glass and Glassware 0 1 1) 
Base Metals and Articles of Base 70 
Metal 28 (20) 45 
Machinery and Mechanical 
Appliances; Electrical Equipment; 
Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders 
and Reproducers, Television 
Image and Sound Recorders and 
Reproducers, and Parts and 
Accessories of Such Articles 1 
Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and 
Associated Transport E uipment 0 
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database 
* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures. 
Table 3 looks at the other side of the coin, i.e., the distribution of 
the sectors affected by SCM actions in exporting countries. Six entities, 
namely, Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia and South Korea are 
considered here for the analysis. China and India have been affected most 
by SCM actions and in both cases a major proportion of the initiations 
have been related to Section XV (Base Metal and articles of Base Metal). 
The other affected sectors include Section VI (Products of Chemical or 
allied industries) and Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber 
and articles thereof). It is observed from the data that the base metal 
sector in Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea are also suffering heavily 
from the SCM initiations and measures in manufacturing products. 
Interestingly, the EU has faced no SCM initiation or measure against its 
base metal products, but rather witnessed initiations against its Section 
III (Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils) and Section IV (Prepared 
Foodstuffs) exports. The emerging difference can be explained in line 
with the subsidy provisions under Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). 
Despite the fact that more than half a century have passed since 
trading countries started discussions on subsidies issue since the Havana 
Charter in order to regulate their misuse, there exists ample room for 
further development. The number of SCM related cases demonstrates 
that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a government could 
have serious repercussions on international trade. The DSB of WTO has 
so far played a significant role in curbing the adverse effects of subsidies 
on foreign countries. For instance, "successive appeals by the European 
Union, the United States and other member countries at the WTO has 
forced China to scrap several export support programs and preferential 
treatment for its exporters. "72 The proven WTO incompatibility of the 
U.S. system for taxing foreign export earnings 73 and modifications in 
Export Credit Guarantee Program for Cotton74 in light ofDSB ruling also 
72. See Fabrice Defever & Alejandro Riano, China's Pure Exporter Subsidies, 1182 
CENTRE FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE 1, 5 (2012). 
73. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Foreign Sales Corporation Drama: Reaching the 
Last Act?, PETERSON INST. FOR lNT'L ECON., No. PB02-10 (2002), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb02-1 O.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
74. See John Baffes, Cotton Subsidies, the WTO, and the 'Cotton Problem', 34 WORLD 
ECON. 1534 (2011). 
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deserve mention. This scenario demonstrates the necessity to improve 
the existing regulations on subsidies at the multilateral level. 
Table 3: Countervailing Measures by Product Type - A 
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IV. REJUVENATING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The influence of government subsidies on export performance is 
estimated here for 140 countries over 1990-2011. Subsidies included in 
the present analysis include only direct budgetary transfers reported by 
the government of a country. The indirect or implicit subsidies (i.e., 
income foregone in terms of tax rebate, fuel subsidy etc.) are not included 
in the analysis due to non-availability of consistent cross-country data. 
The current analysis considers subsidies provided by a country expressed 
as percentage of its GDP for ensuring comparability of data across 
countries, which is accessed from Government Finance Statistics 
("GFS") ofIMF.75 
A. The Economic Data 
As per the GFS Manual of 2001, the IMF reported data on subsidies 
are: 
[C]urrent transfers that government units pay to enterprises either on 
75. See generally Government Finance Statistics, IMF ELIBRARY- DATA (2013), 
available at http://elibrary-data.imf.org/DataExplorer.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
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the basis of the levels of their production activities or on the basis of the 
quantities or values of the goods or services that they produce, sell, or 
import. Included are transfers to public corporations and other 
enterprises that are intended to compensate for operating losses. 76 
23 
Clearly, such subsidies can include actionable transfers and may 
significantly influence exports. Moreover, even de-linked subsidies, 
which are provided solely based on domestic considerations, rather than 
external motivations, may end up providing export boost through indirect 
effects. 
It is observed that GFS compiles the government subsidy figures for 
countries from different government sources as per their reporting 
practice.77 Three types of government reporting have been observed in 
the GFS data.78 First, the General Government ("GG") includes all the 
Central Government ("CG") transfers plus budgetary expenses of all the 
Central Ministries I Departments and the same for the State Governments 
("SG") (including provincial or regional) and Local Governments. 79 The 
Central Government ("CG") transfers on the other hand represent the 
consolidated transfers of the Central Government (including transfers of 
Central Ministries I departments). 80 Finally, subsidies reported under 
Budgetary Central Government ("BCG") covers, "[ a ]ny central 
government entity that is fully covered by the central government 
budget. "81 In addition, the GFS generally reports the budgetary statistics 
for countries adopting cash accounting standards, but for several 
countries, accrual (non-cash) accounting standards for extra-budgetary 
units and social security funds has been reported. In order to understand 
the differential effects of the data reporting differences, suitable dummy 
variables have been included in the empirical model. 
76Government Finance Statistics Manual, IMF 40 (2001), available at 
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/pdf/all.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
77. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: 
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, IMF (2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/intbin.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); see 
generally Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75. 
78. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: 
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally 
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75. 
79. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: 
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally 
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75. 
80. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: 
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally 
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75. 
81. Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: Instructions 
for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4. 
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Several control variables, e.g., the per capita income of the 
countries, the share of agriculture, industry and services in their 
economies, merchandise imports, inward foreign direct investment 
("FDI") stock and political freedom, are included in the analysis in line 
with existing literature. With the growing size of the economy, the 
relative importance of trade is expected to decrease. Furthermore, the 
contribution of various sectors to GDP may show interesting dynamics 
with exports in the presence of subsidies in the model. Inward FDI stock 
is generally favorable for enhancing exports from the recipient country. 82 
In addition, merchandise imports (both raw materials and semi-processed 
products) can boost exports of a country. 83 Finally, political freedom 
leads to economic efficiency, which in tum may enhance exports. 84 
Gross GDP figures in current prices and current exchange rates are 
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
("UNCT AD") Statistics. Merchandise exports and imports in a country 
are considered in the current analysis by expressing them as a percentage 
of its GDP, where all variables (at level) are measured in U.S. Dollars at 
current prices and current exchange rates in millions. The same data is 
accessed from UNCT AD Statistics as well. 85 The share of the three 
sectors in GDP of a country has been obtained from World Development 
Indicators ("WD I") database of the World Bank. 86 The data on political 
freedom is obtained from Freedom House, where the country scores 
range over 1 to 7 (where 1 represents the highest and 7 the lowest level 
of freedom). 87 
82. See Tadashi Ito, Export Platform Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence, 
378 INST. DEVELOPrNG ECON. 4 (Dec. 2012). 
83. See Tahir Mukhtar & Sarwat Rasheed, Testing Long Run Relationship Between 
Exports and Imports: Evidence from Pakistan, 31 J. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 41, 41-42 
(2010); see generally Biswajit Ng & Jaydeep Mukherjee, The Sustainability a/Trade Deficits 
in the Presence of Endogenous Structural Breaks: Evidence from the Indian Economy, 23 J. 
ASIAN ECON. 519, 519-26 (2012); see generally Ramona Dumitru et al., Analysis of the 
Relationship between the Romanian Exports and Imports, 8 ANNALS UNIV. PETROSANI 
ECON. 177, 177-82 (2008). 
84. See Andre Liebenberg, The Relationship Between Economic Freedom, Political 
Freedom and Economic Growth (Nov. 7, 2012) (M.B.A. thesis, Gordon Inst. of Bus. Science, 
Univ. of Pretoria), available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-02232013-
123 734/unrestricted/dissertation. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ). 
85. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., available at 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (to 
access data used). 
86. See generally World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/WDiandGDF excel.zip (last visited Nov. 
16, 2014). 
87. The country scores can be accessed using Freedom House's Index of Democracy. 
See Freedom in the World, FREEDOM HOUSE (2014), available at 
24
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/3
2014] Curtailing Subsidy Wars in Global Trade 25 
In addition, the analysis incorporates a number of constructed 
dummy variables ( e.g. country type dummies, financial system reporting 
dummies, a dummy for the year 1999 and the year dummies) to capture 
their effects on the proposed relationship. However, to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity, only any two of the government dummies (GG, CG and 
BCG) have been simultaneously used at a time in the estimated models. 
Similarly, cash and non-cash dummies have not been used in the 
regression models together. To understand the export implications of 
subsidies in countries situated at different levels of economic 
achievements, four country group dummies are considered separately in 
the model on the basis of Per Capita Gross National Income ("PCGNI", 
atlas method, in current U.S. dollars). The four country groups are as 
follows: low-income economies ("LIE") (PCGNI: US $1,005 or less), 
lower-middle-income economies ("LMIE") (PCGNI: US $1,006-3,975), 
upper-middle-income economies ("UMIE") (PCGNI US $3,976-12,275) 
and high-income economies ("HIE") (PCGNI US $12,276 or more).88 To 
avoid perfect multicollinearity, UMIE was dropped from the analysis. 
B. The Macro Trends 
The macro scenario in the two key series considered in the current 
analysis, namely, budgetary subsidies and merchandise exports, are 
illustrated with the help of Figures 2-4. The time period is divided into 
four equal segments for understanding the temporal perspective. It is 
observed from Figure 2 that the average allocation ofbudgetary subsidies 
( expressed as percentage of GDP) has understandably been higher in 
UMIE and HIE countries as compared to their LIE and LMIE 
counterparts during all four periods reported in the diagram. The average 
subsidy figure in 1995-2000 declined vis-a-vis the corresponding 1990-
1995 figures, but the same increased both during 2001-2005 and 2006-
2011 as compared to the preceding periods. In addition, the gap between 
the two groups of economies has widened during 2006-11. 
http://www. freedomhouse. org/report-types/freedom-world#. VDr7 OmRdWi2 (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014). 
88. Income brackets are in line with the World Bank classification. See Data-Countries 
and Economies, WORLD BANK (2014), available at http://data.worldbank.org/country (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
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Source: Constructed by authors from GFS data 
An annual time trend reported in Figure 3 reveals that from 1999 
onwards, the average subsidy devolution in proportional terms has 
intensified in the developed countries (HIE and UMIE). A similar 
upward trend is noted in their relatively poorer counterparts (LIE and 
LMIE) from 2000 onwards. The trend line drawn for both series (not 
shown in figure) reveals a clear upward trend from 1999 onwards, as a 
result of which a 1999 year dummy ( 1 for year 1999 onwards, 0 for 
others) has been incorporated in the regression models. Another 
important observation from the figure is that for both developed and 
developing countries alike, budgetary transfers ( as % of GDP) increased 
in the face of recession (2008). Though the size of the bailout package 
was larger for developed countries, increase in budgetary transfers for 
developing countries also increased substantially. Nevertheless, given 
budgetary constraints, the withdrawal of special package for recession 
was faster for developing countries from 2009 onwards. 
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Figure 3: Time Trend in Subsidy Figures Across Country 













Source: Constructed by authors from GFS data 
Figure 4 reveals the average merchandise export scenario 
( expressed as percentage of GDP) for the two groups of countries. The 
exports have increased for UMIE and HIEs for all the four periods. 
However, there has been a marginal decline in proportional importance 
of exports for LIE and LMIEs during the last period, 2006-2011. The 
proportional importance of exports in GDP has been higher in UMIE and 
HIEs as compared to their LIE and LMIE counterparts during all four 
periods reported in the diagram. 
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Figure 4: Merchandise Export Scenario in Countries Under 
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Source: Constructed by authors from UNCT AD data 
Finally, Table 4 illustrates the data availability for the present 
analysis as per the government data reporting practices (i.e., GG, CG or 
BCG). The first three columns segregate the total observations as per the 
cash and non-cash (accrual) reporting practices, while the next three 
columns summarize the average subsidy scenario ( as percentage of GDP) 
as per the country groupings. The last three columns represent the 
average export figures expressed as percentage of GDP. It is observed 
that the subsidies and export inclination figures are generally higher for 
countries reporting GG data as compared to corresponding ones 
following CG and BCG reporting practices, barring the exception of 
UMIE and HIE countries in case ofBCG data on average subsidy. 
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Table 4: Description of Data by Availability 
UMI LIE UMI 
Non- Tota E& & E& 
cash 1 HIE All LMIE HIE All 
309 554 863 1.68 1.64 1.65 28.35 36.01 33.85 
659 37 696 1.28 1.56 1.40 26.94 34.04 30.00 
508 102 610 1.12 2.28 1.47 22.85 33.59 26.13 
693 2169 1.31 1.73 1.52 24.88 34.72 29.10 
Source: prepared by the authors from the constructed dataset 
V. RUNNING THE EMPIRICAL TESTS 
Currently, the WTO member countries are engaged in multilateral 
negotiation so as to limit the usage of actionable subsidies in international 
trade, which needs to draw from empirical findings on this front. A cross-
country empirical analysis is undertaken next for understanding the 
influence of budgetary subsidies on export inclination. First, the 
regression model is explained, while the empirical results are 
subsequently presented. 
A. Empirical Model for the Cross-Country Empirical Analysis 
The following panel data regression model is estimated here in order 
to analyze the effect of subsidies on export performance. The advantage 
of using the log-linear model in the current context is that the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as the elasticity between budgetary 
subsidy and exports. 
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LMERXit= a + B LPCGDPit+B2 LPCGDPit2 + B3LSUBSID Yit+ B4
LMERMit+/J5LGDPINDit+ B6LGDPSERit+ B7LGDPAGRIit+ B8
LFDIINSTKit+ B9LFHIPRit+ GOVDUM + Non-Cash + 
















represents the constant term 
are coefficients 
represents log of Merchandise Export ( expressed as 
percentage of GDP) of country i for year t 
represents log of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 
(PPP, current international $) of country i for year t 
represents log ofbudgetary subsidy (as percentage of 
GDP) of country i for year t 
represents the log of Merchandise Import ( expressed as 
percentage of GDP) of country i for year t 
represents the log of share of industry in GDP 
( expressed as percentage of GDP) of country i for year t 
represents the log of share of services in GDP 
(expressed as percentage of GDP) of country i for year t 
represents the log of share of agriculture and allied 
activities in GDP ( expressed as percentage of GDP) of 
country i for year t 
represents the log of inward stock of Foreign Direct 
Investment ( expressed as percentage of GDP) of country 
i for year t 
represents the log of Freedom House Index of Political 
Rights of country i for year t 
represents government dummy, of which 
GG represents a dummy for countries, when the 
subsidy data is reported by the general 
government 
CG represents a dummy for countries, when the 
subsidy data is reported by the central government 
BCG represents a dummy for countries, when the 
subsidy data is reported by the budgetary central 
government 
represents a dummy when countries practice cash 
accounting standards for budgetary reporting 
represents a dummy when countries practice accrual 
accounting standards for budgetary reporting 
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is a dummy whose value is O before 1999 and 1 for 1999 
onwards 
represents the time dummies (i.e., T1=l for 1990 and O 
otherwise) 
represents the disturbance term 
B. Results 
A panel data regression analysis has been undertaken here with help 
of the STATA software (version 10.1). To understand the working of the 
model for the proposed relationship in equation ( 1 ), a Hausman 
specification test is first conducted. It is observed that the Chi-square test 
statistic of 125.13 (Prob>chi2: 0.0000) is statistically significant. The 
Hausman test suggests the presence of a fixed effect model. Next, we 
have conducted a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and 
the test statistics is 78.815 (Prob>F: 0.0000), which implies the presence 
of autocorrelation of first order. A Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg test 
is conducted next and the test statistic is 109.67 (Prob>chi2: 0.0000), 
which points to the presence of heteroskedasticity. The mean Variation 
Inflation Factor ("VIF'') is 2.88, which indicates that the variables 
included in the model are within the tolerance level of multicollinearity. 
Based on these diagnostics, the present analysis estimates Feasible 
Generalized Least Square ("FGLS") regressions with time and country 
group fixed effects and reports results for equation (1) with 
heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation [AR(l)] corrected 
coefficients and standard errors in Table 5. 
The estimation results summarized in Table 5 clearly indicate the 
positive influence of government subsidies on export performance across 
country groups. In both the Fixed Effect ("FE") and FGLS regression 
models, the coefficient of logarithmic transformation of subsidies is 
observed to be positive and significant. 
The results indicate that in both lower and higher income countries, 
the devolution of subsidies are helping them to promote exports, in line 
with the theoretical predictions. The LIE, LMIE and HIE dummies 
included in most of the regression models are all found to be positive and 
significant, implying that all countries, irrespective of their income levels, 
benefit from the provision of subsidies. Interestingly, the coefficient for 
the LIE dummy is found to be non-significant in the fixed effect model, 
but larger as compared to the corresponding figures for LMIE and HIE 
country group dummies under the FGLS models. In addition, the 
coefficients of the LMIE dummies are found to be larger than the HIE 
dummies. In other words, greater devolution of subsidies in lower 
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income group countries leads to greater export growth. The result can be 
explained by the structural ( e.g., poorer infrastructure, imperfect factor 
markets) and operational bottlenecks (e.g., lower margins, scale 
disadvantages) prevalent in LDCs and other poorer economies, and 
greater devolution of budgetary support can overcome these constraints 
and effectively promote exports from their territories. However, the 
dummies are found to be statistically non-significant under some model 
specifications. 
Table 5: Estimation Results on the Relationship Between Subsidy 
and Merchandise Exports 
Independent 
Dependent Variable: LMERX 
Variables 
Constant 1.4188** 0.8255 2.1654*** 0.6783 0.7779 
(0.5793) (0.6103) (0.7556) (0.6282) (0.6634) 
lpcgdp -0.1894*** -0.5537*** -0.3933** -0.8073*** -0.518*** 
(0.0514) (0.1478) (0.1753) (0.1456) (0.1593) 
lpcgdp2 0.0395*** 0.0303*** 0.0509*** 0.0374*** 
(0.0082) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0088) 
/subsidy 0.01 73*** 0.0069* 0.0093** 0.0067* 0.0088** 
(0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
lmerm 0.6772*** 0.7222*** 0.7163*** 0.7036*** 0.6768*** 
(0.0304) (0.01 59) (0.017) (0.0168) (0.0174) 
lgdpind 0.5435*** 0.7816*** 0.5601 *** 0.9097*** 0.7859*** 
(0.0575) (0.0425) (0.0534) (0.0315) (0.0457) 
/gdpser -0.2284*** -0.2913*** -0.5681 *** -0.284*** 




lfdiinstk 0.0208** 0.0436*** 0.0262*** 0.0367*** 0.0415*** 
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cg -0.0692*** 0.0201 0.0132 0.0182 0.0188 
(0.0212) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0139) 
bcg -0.0529* -0.0293 -0.0074 -0.0105 -0.0196 
(0.0287) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0193) 
noncash 0.0182 0.0363** 0.0246* 0.0312** 0.027* 
(0.0214) (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0153) (0.0148) 
lie 0.0021 0.0765*** 0.0429 0.0691 ** 0.0639** 
(0.0407) (0.0295) (0.0332) (0.0309) (0.0302) 
lmie 0.0611 *** 0.0451 *** 0.0418** 0.0449*** 0.0445*** 
(0.0233) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0158) 
hie 0.0472* 0.0352* 0.0139 0.023 0.0272 
(0.0259) (0.019) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.019) 
dum/999 0.1102*** 0.0638*** 0.0598*** 0.064*** 0.0763*** 
(0.0397) (0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0244) (0.0242) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 1792 1788 1573 1773 1764 
No. of Grs 139 135 120 134 133 
WaldChi2 44.67# 4846.05 3517.11 4194.69 3807.22 
Prob 
0.0000@ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Wald chi2) 
Notes:# implies F-Stat (instead of Wald chi2 for Model 1) 
@ implies Prob (F-Stat) (instead of Prob (Wald chi2) for Modell) 
Figure in the parenthesis shows the heteroskedasticity and first order 
autocorrelation [ AR( 1)] corrected standard error of the estimated coefficient 
***,**and* implies estimated coefficient is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level respectively. 
33 
Among the control variables, log of per capita GDP of a country is 
found to be negatively related with log of export inclination, while the 
square term is positively significant. The result implies that the growth 
rate of exports declines with rise in growth rate of GDP, which is higher 
for the low income countries starting from a lower base. The result is in 
line with the coefficient of country dummies and clearly signifies that 
higher economic size is more favorable for outward orientation. Log of 
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merchandise import ("LMERM") bears a positive coefficient with the 
dependent variable, indicating that higher merchandise import growth 
rate leads to higher merchandise exports. The relationship can be 
explained by the fact that deeper association with integrated production 
networks with trade partners lead to higher import of quality raw material 
and semi-processed inputs, which contributes to the rise in value-added 
final exports. 
The independent variable GDPIND is positively related with export 
inclination, as generation of greater manufacturing (including mining, 
construction, electricity, water supply and gas) output leads to higher 
export surplus. Share of agriculture is, however, not significant in any of 
the regression models. As per expectation, FDI inward stock variable is 
positively related to export inclination, signifying presence of "export-
platform" FDI in the cross-country framework. Finally, political freedom 
variable is found to be non-significant, owing to the fact that both 
countries characterized by deeper democratic practices (e.g. U.S.) and 
more stringent regimes (e.g. China) demonstrate higher export 
inclination. 
Capturing the influence of the level of government that provides 
budgetary subsidy for a particular country is important. Following the 
GFS reporting principle, in absence of information on GG budgetary 
subsidy for a country, the current analysis considers CG or BCG in the 
estimated model. It is observed that in all reported models the coefficient 
of both CG and BCG bear a negative sign. The result strongly underlines 
the significance of the reported layer of government subsidies on exports, 
as CG and BCG subsidies are associated with differential intercept shifts. 
The dummies represent the information at a more disaggregated level of 
government, which are associated with lesser export inclination. The 
coefficient of the non-cash dummy is found to be positive in sign. The 
result underlines the importance of the accounting system and implies 
that adoption of accrual accounting across the countries is desirable. The 
coefficients of both the set of support category dummies strongly indicate 
that the layer of government data reporting system and their accounting 
technique considerably influence the relationship. The 1999 dummy has 
been found to be positive and significant, indicating that subsidy-export 
relationship received a boost in the post 1999 period.89 Finally, the 
reported coefficients of the time dummies are also significant. 
89. It may be noted that the year 1999 has been marked by the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial meeting of the WTO. 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: LESSONS FOR THE CURRENT 
WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
The waves of globalization during the last decade have led to 
deepening of international trade flows in general and in manufacturing 
products in particular.90 On one hand, the evolving trade dynamics have 
created an urge in developing countries and LDCs to enable the domestic 
players to enjoy a level-playing field in the international markets and also 
to actively attract production-related foreign investment. Provision of 
subsidies for augmenting advantages for local players has played a crucial 
role in this context. On the other hand, declining competitiveness has 
forced their developed counterparts to contemplate continuation of 
subsidy policies within their territories. In addition to the direct export 
subsidies, the indirect subsidies may also positively influence export 
pattern. The empirically observed subsidy-exports interrelationship in 
the current analysis needs to be viewed in this wider context. 
Firstly, the number of cases in international trade practice 
demonstrated that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a 
government could have serious adverse effects on international trade. 
This situation strongly underlines the necessity to improve the regulation 
on subsidies at the multilateral level. Despite the fact that more than half 
a century passed since trading countries started negotiations on subsidies 
issues, it seems international trade law still have room for further 
development. The discussion of the completed disputes on ASCM 
indicates that several major provisions of the agreement have been 
liberally misused by WTO members by targeting low-cost Asian 
countries. As a result, the CVD activism effect has been felt more 
seriously by the middle income developing countries and the emerging 
economies, who have also witnessed an increasing share of 
manufacturing sector in their respective GDP. Therefore, the current 
negotiation on rules should attempt to prevent such misuse through 
relevant modification of the ASCM text. 
In particular, the data reporting practices across countries differ 
widely, often providing some economies with the flexibility to hide the 
quantum of subsidies devolution to the local players. The negotiation on 
fisheries subsidies is a case in point, where such data reporting practices 
mismatch largely contributes to the delay in curbing the 'Article 1' 
subsidies. Hence, the subsidies data reporting framework of countries 
needs to be harmonized. The empirical observations of the current 
90. See Julien Chaisse, 'Exploring the Confines of International Investment and 
Domestic Health Protections', 39 AM. J. L. AND MED. 332, 332-361 (2013). 
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analysis, underlining the importance of data reporting framework in 
determining the 'export-effect' of the subsidies, is of crucial policy 
relevance in that context. 
Secondly, supporting the domestic players through subsidy policy 
has been a traditional policy tool adopted by both developed and 
developing countries. The developed countries, with their greater 
financial strength, has enabled the local players to have an edge vis-a-vis 
the foreign players, not only in the domestic market, but also in the third 
markets. Such policies have been practiced in Australia, Canada, the EU 
and the U.S., i.e., the Quad countries, for a long time. These 
developments have motivated several developing and emerging countries 
since the 1970s onward to mimic the subsidy-led export success of their 
developed counterparts. The empirical results indicate a successful 
adoption of the subsidy-led export growth policy in both lower-income 
and lower-middle income economies as well. 
The empirical results underline that continuing subsidies makes 
economic sense from the selfish standpoint of an individual country, 
irrespective of its development status. However, given the economic 
discrepancy between developed and developing country exports, a 
subsidy-based trade war is more likely to put the latter group in a 
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis their developed counterparts. In 
particular, continuation of subsidy policies in developing countries and 
LDCs end up only providing moral justification for the higher SCM 
activism in their developed counterparts. The evidence presented from 
the base metal sector is a case in point. Moreover, provision of subsidies 
create diverging influence on exports of countries belonging to different 
income groups, as evident from the significance of the country group 
dummy coefficients, adds further to the disadvantages of the poorer 
economies. The empirical findings of the current paper therefore 
underline the importance of concluding the Doha Round Negotiations of 
WTO in general and disciplining subsidies in particular in no uncertain 
terms. 
"The third major issue that has caused political turmoil in the 
negotiations surrounding the Doha Agreement and the post Uruguay 
round of talks at the WTO is in the area of export refunds and subsidies. 
At Bali, the ministers agreed to ensure export subsidies and other 
measures with similar effect are [reduced]."91 "With no legally binding 
91. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3; see also Ministerial 
Conference of7 December 2013, WT/MIN(l3)/40-WT/L/915 (2013), WORLD TRADE 0RG., 
available at http://wto.org/english/thewto e/minist_ e/mc9 el 
balipackage_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
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arrangements, the good will statements are open to abuse and the 
disputes' panel of the [WTO] could be just as busy as it has been with 
countries arguing over subsidies and tariffs and quotas as much as they 
have over the last [two decades] ."92 "The fact that the U.S. has opted out 
of the tariff quota arrangements also forewarns of arguments and trouble 
and it appears that the current trend for bilateral negotiations for free trade 
agreements will be the route forward and the work in the WT0."93 
92. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3. 
93 . Id. 
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